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G. H. Mead (1863-1931) was a social theoretical thinker of the notion “Self” construction. Being 
as part of the political activists, he tried to establish “the real path leading to the truth of 
“socialism”” in the States and recognition of self.  
How was his vision of this model? What were the major elements of this interaction and how are 
they implied in interpersonal relations of the community units? The purpose of this article is to try 
making some in-depth analyses referring to this interrelation and generalizing the ideas of some 
philosophers around this issue. 
 Quite devoted to the idea of progressive politics in America, he envisioned this path through 
“changing the conduct or behavior of individuals and social groups”1. Whatever the followed 
objective and interpretive explanations by scholars were, Mead always retained his exceptional and 
passionate optimism in interpretation of self through the metamorphoses of social groups and 
systems. Thus, he stated that individuals might retain their objective nature only through endless 
interactions with social groups and each of their members. But how? Let us review some opinions 
referring to this reflexiveness.  
If we put the path of recognizing the social facts of “Self” by G. H. Mead into the so called 
“generalized other”2 offered by outstanding American philosopher John Ryder,  then “Me”, 
changes through the following interactions with stimuli to emerge the new “chain of 
interrelationships of object with subject”. Evidently, then the major assumptions drawn are: 
a) ‘self’ is not equal to ‘I’; b) ‘self’ is always an object; c) object always involves subject; d) so, 
‘me’ is inconceivable without an ‘I’; e) and, at last, ‘I’ is presupposition, but never a present 
conscious experience because it is passed into the objective case. 
Interestingly, such kind of “mechanical quantative” changes, without doubt, also cause to arising 
of some new qualitative alterations in organized community interrelationship. For example, it is 
quite helpful while defining the criteria of assessing “moral psychological climate of the 
community groups”, where the general evaluations of the community group climate cannot be 
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 equalized to the summative pile up of individual features and personal traits. Apparently, it is more 
than that, that is why, in most cases the sociologists agree that satisfaction of each individual (“I”) 
in community units is measured by the general satisfactory status of the interpersonal units (“Self”) 
affecting on each personality. Thus, philosophers judge this status by the “result-driven essentials” 
of the moral-psychological climate.   
By our opinion, “satisfaction” is vague notion, and is more subjective rather than objective from 
the viewpoint of its inception; it needs further concretization. For instance, there is wide a range of 
unsatisfactory elements existing in community interaction suggested by G.A. Mochenov. This is, 
first, the width of the dissatisfaction spectrum of each community individual; second, these are the 
components of spectrum of dissatisfaction which include as the total community dissatisfaction, as 
well as the dissatisfaction of its each individual with the “complex” nature of human interrelations; 
third,  it involves the scale of dissatisfaction of each individual with separate components of 
human interrelation; and the last is the depth of dissatisfaction with separate elements of 
community which is an indication of dissatisfaction level.3     
It is quite clear that, the ‘wholeness’ of the moral-psychological climate (self) manifests itself as 
discontinuity in its continuous nature of development and occurrence (I), acting as pre-dominance 
of some values “inhabiting” in the community conscious and psychology, in the practical 
interpersonal and intercommunity relations.  
Similarly, once logically analyzed, Mead’s social “self analysis” interpreted by Andy Brunden, 
from Brock University,4 assumes such kind of “rediintegrated“ character, where initially “self” is 
not lying perforce to be immediately equal to “I”, at least because the first is subject, and the latter 
is object. Moreover, they appear sequentially, but not simultaneously where self cannot emerge in 
consciousness as an “I”.5 
Furthermore, “self” is enough disturbed to change the objective character of “I, i.e. ‘self’ is always 
an object whereas ‘I’ presents itself as subject. By Fichte, because the “I” - thing-in-itself, had just 
been discredited, at once prepared a system without any thing-in-itself. Consequently, he rejected 
the assumption of anything that was not through and through merely our representation, and 
therefore let the knowing subject be all in all or at any rate produce everything from its own 
resources. For this purpose, he at once did away with the essential and most meritorious part of the 
Kantian doctrine, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori and thus that between the 
phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. For he declared everything to be a priori, naturally without 
any evidence for such a monstrous assertion; instead of these, he gave sophisms and even crazy 
sham demonstrations whose absurdity was concealed under the mask of profundity and of the 
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 incomprehensibility ostensibly arising the reform. Moreover, he appealed boldly and openly to 
intellectual intuition, that is, really to inspiration.6  
Finally, self is phenomenological and “complicated” “I” with a system of continuum complexity of 
interaction.   But there is an outstanding question: “Does it have a capacity to subjugate “I”? This 
would probably put an end to the thesis about the real essence of the personality which is 
determined through endless experiences and interactions of “I” with the outer world. The likely 
continuum of transference is conditioned by two – sided relations where mediation is usually made 
invisibly.   
There are also some very interesting parallels drawn between Hegelian and Meadian philosophies. 
The definition of subject which Andy proposes is the “subject is a self-conscious system of 
activity”. An individual fits this definition, insofar as the individual, self-evidently a system of 
activity, is a self-conscious, sovereign and rational person; a social subject fits this definition as 
well, insofar as the system of activity acts as a moral agent in the world, has corporate knowledge, 
and has a continuing (corporate) identity.7 
The self-consciousness discussed above also qualifies as a subject. We have a specific kind of 
collaborative activity amongst individual human beings. But the relation between the individual 
and the individual’s ‘human habitat’ is different. Self-consciousness in this sense can only be 
conceived of in isolation from Objective Spirit by throwing one’s mind back to the Stone Age. 8 
In summary, the individual does not distinguish between themself and the community. We see this 
type of consciousness expressed in Aristotle’s definition of the Subject which means that the 
subject is an individual of the community, alike but independent. Thus, no reason to suppose that 
what goes inside someone else’s head is any different from what goes on in her own, even if 
people are outwardly different (gender and age differences and the natural division of labor aside).9 
The objective nature of the experienced subject alternates between the needs of the master subject 
and their satisfaction. That is, the objectification (Object) of the new, class-ridden subjectivity is 
the practical activity of the subordinated subject. On the other hand, the needs of the enslaved 
subject its the entire culture (Subjective Spirit) are replaced by that of the master-subject into 
which they have been drawn in a subordinate position; it is the consciousness of the master-subject 
which controls their labor mediating between their consciousness and their material activity. The 
subject becomes a unity of theory and practice in which the dominated subject is absorbed in 
practice while the dominant subject is absorbed in theory, i.e, the direction and organization of 
labor. Each mediates the other.  
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 The relationship is consonant with the I-me dialectic first discovered by Fichte, and taken up by 
the George Herbert Mead and others (Aron R,Earl Raab,Ganter G, Yeakel M, S. Herman,             
C. Richard and others) in which each subject in the relationship sees an image of themself in the 
material activity of the other subject. What we have then in Hegel’s outline of Self-Consciousness 
in the Subjective Spirit is a form of subjectivity which is fundamentally intuitive; it “rises to” 
intelligence, but even in the most developed society, the subjectivity of the citizens apprehends the 
culture of the broader society in a physical, sensual, intuitive, practical and taken-for-granted 
interpersonal way. 
This is not to say though that the notion of “self-consciousness” is an inherently individual 
concept. As we remarked above, this process of the development of Subjective Spirit is Hegel’s 
description of the emergence of the sovereign individual, the presupposition of Kantian 
philosophy. Mead's “Mind, Self, and Society” which was published in 1934 clearly identify the 
real path of ‘self modification’ to compose the holistic interaction with the total social system. It is 
somehow the interaction of immaterial mind and the material body – immaterial mind and the 
material body are two completely different types of substances of two completely different types 
of substances. The Subjective Spirit constitutes a principle which is apprehended intuitively 
through participation in a shared form of life. 
 
Overall, G. H. Mead’s introspective “self” as a process of interaction of object and subject has a 
direct relation and interpretative power in evaluating moral-psychological climate of the organized 
community units. Because in moral - psychological climate of the organized units the personality 
itself (I), more concretely “the interactively-changing personality”, acts in kind of Subject; but in 
relation to moral-psychological climate of the organized human group, as a social factor, the 
personality plays the least role as an Object. The practice of intercommunity and intergroup 
relations here acts as a “means” providing the development of personality in such organized 
groups. Actually this “means” is also realized through such kind of “qualities” of a personality-in-
action as his/her more increasing demands and abilities, capacities and consciousness. By 
comprehending itself, the “I” also establishes the other “self”, ‘the generalized other”    
 
 
 
 
 
